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Abstract—Enterprise networks face a magnitude of threats that
are managed and mitigated with a combination of proprietary
and third-party security tools and services. However, the tech-
niques and principles employed by the said tools, techniques and
services are quite conventional and lack the rapid evolution, as
required to protect against modern, state-of-the-art threats faced,
specifically, against distributed denial of service (DDoS) attacks.
The lack of efficiency of a network is directly proportional to
the number of applications and services it hosts, particularly
to protect against external and internal threats. Moreover, the
effectiveness of such security mechanisms relies on their inde-
pendent and proactive approach, which is only as effective as
their knowledge of known malware and their attack vectors that
becomes obsolete when there is a new malware or a zero-day
vulnerability is exploited.
This paper presents an intelligent, highly responsive, and
scalable security framework for enterprise networks. The pro-
posed framework incorporates Apache Spark Framework for
security analytics and accurately identifies anomalies specifically
pertaining to DDoS attacks from real-time network traffic
by using customised machine learning algorithms meticulously
trained against selected feature-set. The results are tested against
different scenarios and bench-marked with the results achieved
by related studies in similar scenarios.
Index Terms—DDoS, Network Security, Apache Spark,
Anomaly Detection, Machine Learning, Big Data Analytics, Se-
curity Analytics, Malware.
I. INTRODUCTION
The heterogeneity in modern enterprise networks has enabled
organizations to not only expand their business operations, it
has also provided an opportunity for businesses to efficiently
use their skilled resources in order to optimise the effectiveness
of every operation. The inclusion of diverse set of devices and
tools in regular enterprise networks, has significantly increased
the efficacy of majority of related operations. This level of
heterogeneity has also diminished physical and geographical
boundaries generally faced by enterprises in the past [1].
The benefits of loosely coupled infrastructure for modern
enterprises outweighs the regular network policies and com-
pliance, followed by such enterprises to enhance performance
and security [2]. However, securing such a loosely coupled
enterprise network is significantly complicated and requires a
combination of tools and techniques that can detect and prevent
proactively with minimum to no human dependency.
In current security ecosystem, if an organization is infected,
it takes approximately six months to just identify that infection
[3], and that too, if there is a predefined malicious behaviour
identified by intrusion detection systems (IDS). Generally, the
technique of exploiting enterprise networks without triggering
security alerts with malicious activities, is used by attackers
with an intent of distributed denial of service (DDoS) attacks
[4].
To timely detect DDoS or similar attacks, enterprises heavily
rely on tools that are based on security analytics techniques,
which means identification based on; signatures, heuristics, and
behaviours of known malware, along with their attack vectors
[5]. This approach is quite effective and can protect against
numerous attacks, as the majority of malware released every
day are variants of previously known malware [6]. Therefore,
using signature, heuristics, and brief behavioural feature-set,
is quite effective. However, if the attack is originated by a
new/unknown malware, exploiting a zero-day vulnerability in a
network, then it can bypass the said security measures without
getting detected.
The effectiveness of Intrusion detection systems, antiviruses,
and other similar security tools, against unknown malware, has
been practically evaluated a number of times and the results
are quite different from what is claimed by vendors of said
tools. The lack of threat and anomaly detection is not the
only issue, the network and computing resources consumed
by the network security tools, along with the level of privilege
they require, gives them the highest level of priority on the
infrastructure. According to a recent evaluation, enterprise
antiviruses consume 45% of CPU resources, while scanning
for threats and they are able to detect less than 60% of threats
[7]. These statistics quite accurately depict the performance of
security tools, along with the implications they can have on
host networks.
The issues related to network security tools are not recently
identified, its an on-going discussion in the security community.
There are several solutions proposed by different researchers
that quite accurately detect previously unknown malware
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Fig. 1: Antivirus Evaluation w.r.t. CPU Usage and Detection
Rate [7]
using novel techniques. Additionally, the implementation of
machine learning (ML) algorithms, artificial neural networks,
etc. to accurately detect malicious activity is quite successfully
proposed and evaluated by several studies. In some selected
studies, the level of accuracy for malware identification is 97%
- 98% [8], which is significantly higher than the conventional
security tools.
Moreover, similar machine learning techniques have been
used by other selected studies, discussed in later sections, to
accurately detect malicious activities in network logs, pertaining
to DDoS and other similar attacks. The said approaches
train ML algorithms against heuristics to accurately identify
anomalies in network logs. The results of these techniques also
surpass the identification statistics associated with conventional
security tools.
The aforementioned techniques proposed and self-evaluated
by many studies, depict promising results while accurately
detecting malware in a single machine or anomalies in network
logs, associated with DDoS. However, there are two critical
aspects of enterprise network security that are quite commonly
overlooked; live anomaly detection and energy efficiency.
The aforementioned proposed solutions do provide tech-
niques with promising detection rate and level of accuracy but
rarely evaluate the solution on the basis of energy efficiency.
The effectiveness of such solutions is directly proportional to
the resources they consume, however, in real-time network
environments it is required to be inversely proportional.
Moreover, the higher detection rate is achieved against logged
data, which is quite different environment as compared to live
traffic. A majority of the studies that claim the higher level of
accuracy, deal with the stored feature-set, network logs, etc.
Moreover, the primary difference in a live network and in stored
network logs is the level of entropy the live environment entails.
This means, if machine learning algorithms are trained on stored
network logs, then it is quite likely that their implementation on
the live network will generate a high number of false positives
and negatives.
There exists a significant gap in security mechanisms that
are currently used and even proposed to fill the existing gaps
in network security. It is required to have a solution that
independently and accurately identifies threats and anomalies
in live network traffic with minimum amount of time.
This paper initially presents a comparative analysis for
streaming NetFlow traffic, including KDD, and UNSW-NB-
15, which is later used for training supervised machine
learning models for early anomaly detection. Moreover, the
UNSW-NB-15 NetFlow dataset is then incorporated with
Hadoop Framework: Spark, the results of this integration are
compared with existing Hadoop Framework: MapReduce. This
comparative analysis presents a significant improvement of
real-time data analysis w.r.t. time and accuracy, by accurately
detecting anomalies in a very short interval.
The framework, SAD-F: Spark-based Automated Anomaly
Detection Framework, proposed in this paper, is specifically
designed to befit real-time network security scenarios, namely;
anomaly detection in live enterprise networks within a very
short interval and anomaly identification through analysis of
stored indicators of compromise (IoC). These two primary
features of the proposed framework are the key elements that
address the aforementioned gap in the research in the area
of network security. Moreover, to ensure that the proposed
framework meets the performance parameters initially set, a
thorough evaluation is performed. Additionally, the results of
evaluation are used to compare with the results of existing
solutions and benchmarking.
SAD-F is more appealing and close to real-time network
security requirements, as compared to similar approaches for
the following reasons:
• Although the frameworks, solutions, tools, and techniques
currently used in conventional enterprise network environ-
ments, and proposed to fill the gaps in the existing security
solutions, do address the issues. However, the current
solutions lack the incorporation of entropy associated
with the real-time network traffic, and the approach
incorporating real-time entropy to achieve high level of
accuracy has a lasting and scalable impact.
• Enterprise networks have a requirement of immediate
identification of anomalies that can lead to malicious
entities in the network, specifically, the ones leading to
DDoS. The incorporation of security analytics, supported
by machine learning models, trained against customised
feature-set, enable SAD-F to identify anomalies in live
network traffic stream in a responsive manner. Following
are the machine learning algorithms that support the
proposed framework.
– K-Nearest Neighbour (KNN)
– Nave Bayes (NB)
– Random Forest (RF)
– Decision Tree (DT)
– Support Vector Machine (SVM)
• The response time offered by SAD-F is benchmarked
against existing solutions, which means that the effec-
tiveness of the proposed framework is measured against
accuracy and timeliness. These are the two parameters that
complement each other while identifying the effectiveness
of such a framework.
• The proposed framework is implemented using open
source highly responsive analytics engine designed for
large-scale data processing, known as Spark. Therefore,
the results presented, discussed, and benchmarked later in
this paper are not limited to the experimental dataset, it is
also highly scalable to accommodate any form of packet
stream in a real-time heterogeneous network.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows; Section II
presents a discussion on the research performed in the same
area, Section III presents an in-depth discussion on the proposed
framework and how different aspects of the framework are
implemented, Section IV presents a discussion on the datasets
used in the experiments and benchmarking, Section IV presents
a step-by-step walkthrough of testbed design, Section VI is
comprised of experiments performed, analysis of results, along
with the critical evaluation of the proposed framework and
benchmarking based on related research results, Section VII
presents the conclusion of the study.
II. RELATED WORK
There are some notable solutions published on network
anomaly detection techniques [9],including studies incorporat-
ing machine learning in their solutions. There are also such
studies that focus on anomaly detection in big-data related
domains [10], [11]. In recent studies, many different techniques
have been studied to solve the traffic classification problem.
The majority of current classification approaches still rely on
packet header based anomaly detection and protocol based
anomaly detection [12].
In paper [13] Romain et al. proposed a new framework;
Hashdoop (extension to Hadoop MapReduced). Hashdoop
suggest a solution over a drawback of Hadoop (Spatial and
Temporal structure) when it comes to the point of splits of
network traffic over different nodes for distributed processing.
Hashdoop splits traffic with hash function to preserve traffic
structure which lead to outstanding performance over detection
of network anomalies. Hashdoop were evaluated with two
anomaly detectors and fifteen traces of Internet backbone traffic
captured between 2001 and 2013. Hashdoop with 6-node cluster
increased the throughput and enable real-time detection of large
analyzed traces. Hashdoop improves the overall accuracy for
anomalies detection process.
Hashdoop, experiments were conducted on MAWI archive
dataset and more precisely, traffic captured at between U.S
and Japan on Sample point B and Sample point F. There is
a performance trade-off, authors noted that dividing traffic
into many small splits can cause for adverse results because
each split may contain insufficient traffic for the statistical
analysis, they left this gap for future work or considered to be
an open challenge. Taking the above stated gap as our research
study, we are expecting a step ahead solution; instead of using
MapReduced technique we will utilize distributed computing
stream processing for analysis of the same data and bears better
results from existing study.
In paper [14] Juliette et al. stated in their study, the
problem of unsupervised network anomaly has been studied
in the last decade. Many studies were proposed time to time.
Furthermore, they commented mostly unsupervised network
anomaly detectors were depend on clustering techniques.
Clustering algorithms group similar flows on to same cluster.
The study presented a novel technique, unsupervised Network
Anomaly Detectors Analysis (UNADA). This took advantage
of distributed computing system to speed up their process.
Dividing the features space in sub spaces which allows UNADA
to run in parallel multiple DBSCANs and EA algorithms. Lastly,
authors claimed that their proposed techniques’ UNADA’s
deployment in real time stream tool ’Spark’ can improve
execution time by a factor of 13. Experiments were conducted
on grid5000 testbed.
Extensive work have been proposed in the field of SDN for
DDoS mitigation. In paper [15] authors proposed a collaborative
distributed denial of service (DDoS) attack mitigation scheme
using software defined network. They design a secure controller
to controller (C-to-C) protocol that allows software defined
network controllers lying in different autonomous systems
(AS) to securely communicate and transfer attack information
with each other. Further, as in extension they proposed an
other scientific work [16]. They introduced three different
deployment approaches i.e., linear, central and mesh. Which
enables efficient notification along the path of an ongoing attack
and effective filtering of traffic near the source of attack, thus
saving valuable time and network resources. In experiments,
they showed SDN based collaborative scheme is capable of
efficiently mitigating DDoS.
In paper [9] Ahmad et al.presented in their work, one of the
challenging module of the intrusion detection system known as
feature extraction, and presented comparative analysis/results
for TCP based traffic. They implemented their system by
using Apache Spark and Netmap. Authors claimed, that their
proposed system works well for small organization. This system
was designed on the top of CAIDA NetFlow attack dataset.
Limitation of their work can be overlook by deploying same
system for large scale NetFlow traffic dataset, specifically for
large organizations.
In paper [17] Milan et al. proposed a novel performance
benchmark based on common security analysis algorithms
for NetFlow data to show suitability of distributed stream
processing system. Hadoop based system works only for batch
processing and do not offer stream processing (real-time)
analysis.
In order to overcome the limitations of Hadoop, three of the
most used distributed systems were taken for stream processing
experiments such as Spark, Samza, and Storm. Experiments
were conducted on the top of CAIDA NetFlow dataset. Lastly,
this study presents performance benchmark chart to justify the
outcome.
In paper [10] and [18] Pedro Crass et al. introduced a new
framework for network analytic named BIG-DAMA, a Big Data
Analytic framework (BDAF) for network traffic monitoring
and analysis applications (NTMA). BIG-DAMA is a new and
flexible framework, which is capable to analyze and store large
data including stream and batch. This study also implements
multiple data analytic techniques for network security and
anomaly detection. Different machine learning were used.
Authors claimed that they applied their technique with different
types of attacks and benchmark outcome. Experiments were
conducted on the top of MAWI dataset. Further, authors claimed
that BIG-DAMA can speed up computation by a factor of
10 with respect to existing solutions. Proposed system; BIG-
DAMA can easily deployable in cloud environment using
virtualization techniques.
After going through from related work, we came up with a
system and expects efficient in terms of time of computation and
accurate enough from existing system. In order to achieve the
objective, we deployed two of the streaming dataset including
KDD99 and UNSW-NB15 and predicting accurate results for
anomalies such as DoS, DDoS, IP Scanning, Port Scanning,
etc. This paper investigates existing and proposed work and
benchmark the difference. Lastly, this paper also list literature
work on the Netflow data preprocessing techniques.
III. SPARK BASED ANOMALY DETECTION FRAMEWORK -
(SAD-F)
The purpose of this study is to contribute and to fill the
research gap as highlighted from [10], [19], [20] discussed
above in section Problem Statement. The follow-up sections de-
scribes the subsections including proposed framework, dataset
selection, data preprocessing techniques, model selection,
results, conclusion and future work.
A. Proposed Framework
In this study, we propose a successor of our previously
purposed framework in base study [19], [20], which comprise
of five major phases implemented as separate components
including:
1) Netflow traffic capturing server and or netflow traffic
selector
2) Preprocessing of netflow data
3) Spark cluster simulation phase
4) Anomaly detector
5) Result in a form of graph or notification to the concern
body
As per limitations discussed, we upgraded framework 2 adding
stream processing by spark and removing counter based
algorithm which were supposed to find listed anomalies. But
this proposed SAD-Framework is mainly focused towards
finding anomalies from known as well as unknown data
with preferred low-level hardware also known as commodity
hardware. One can see difference between proposed framework
components and previous work 2 and 3.
B. Netflow traffic capturing server and or netflow traffic
selector
In this phase, one may supposed to directly pass Netflow
dataset or captures live traffic with the help of network capturing
tool Wireshark with predefined filters to filter network traffic.
This framework is flexible and offers admin perspective web
interface through which admin can tune capturing process by
parameter tuning for desired live traffic. But at this stage we
are not designing admin portal instead we will use passive
netflow data to the file transfer stage. After loading capture file,
file format could be (.cap, .pcap or csv) this file will pass over
”Preprocessing and Detection stage” which is further discussed
in upcoming subsection.
Live traffic may contain some of predefined filters to capture
required network traffic. For example, parameters could be
packet size, no of frames and desired protocol filter etc. As
admin finalized the parameter-tuning/ filter-setting capturing
tool begins to capture as depicted in figure-3. Along with
the traffic capturing process that file will be logged and will
be transferred further for preprocessing and detection process
which is further discussed below in subsection. Example filters
are shown in figure-4 as reference these filters may help future
researchers to begin with live capturing.
C. Data preprocessing techniques
The hard part of the anomaly detection process is the pre-
processing of network traces. Data preprocessing is recognized
as an important step in anomaly detection. Review shows that
preprocessing needs domain experts for better features selection
which leads improvements in results. The review also finds
that many studies limit their preprocessing steps and do not
discuss in details in their work. [10]
As network traffic file will arrive at this stage preprocessing
and anomaly detection process will begin. Data preprocessing
is a must step in all knowledge discovery tasks from which
preprocessing of network-based intrusion detection took 50
percent [12] effort of the overall process which results better
to classify network traffic as normal or anomalous. Removing
strong co-relate,irrelevant and redundant features also improves
the detection rate for learning based algorithms. This study
focuses on the netflow preprocessing stage and for that we
designed a novel approach for preprocessing and we studied
various formal process models which were proposed for
knowledge discovery and data mining (KDDM) as discussed
in [21]. After thoroughly reviewing studies [12], [21], we
found standard preprocessing steps include dataset creation,
data cleaning, integration, feature construction to derive
new higher-level features, feature selection to choose the
optimal subset of relevant features, reduction. The most
relevant steps for network intrusion deduction systems are
briefly described:
• Dataset creation: Involves identifying representative
network traffic for training and testing. These datasets
should be labeled indicating whether the connection is
normal or anomalous. Labeling network traffic can be a
very time consuming and difficult task.
• Feature construction: It aims to create needed additional
features with a better discriminating ability than the initial
feature set. This step can bring significant improvement to
machine learning algorithms. Features can be constructed
Fig. 2: HADEC: Hadoop based Live DDoS Detection framework;”figure reused from scientific paper” [19], [20]
Fig. 3: SAD-F: Spark Based Anomaly Detection Framework
manually, or by using data mining methods such as se-
quence analysis, association mining, and frequent episode
mining
• Reduction: It is commonly used technique to decrease the
dimensionality of the dataset by discarding any redundant
or irrelevant features. This process of feature optimization
is called feature selection, and is commonly used to
alleviate the curse of dimensionality. Data reduction can
also be achieved with feature extraction which transforms
the initial feature set into a reduced number of new
features. Principal component analysis (PCA) is a common
linear method used for data reduction.
Preprocessing converts network traffic into a series of observa-
tions, where each observation is represented as a feature vector.
Observations are optionally labeled with it’s classes, such as
normal or anomalous. These feature vectors are then suitable as
input to data mining or machine learning algorithms. Machine
learning is the use of algorithms which evolve according to
the labeled data instances (observations) provided to it. The
algorithms are able to generalize from these observations, hence
allowing future observations to be automatically classified.
Machine learning is widely used in anomaly-based NIDS with
examples including [22] and the Principal Component Classifier
by [23]
After successful process, the preprocessed file will be trans-
ferred further to spark cluster manager for further classification
process and file will be tested against pre-trained model and
results will be logged for further notification process which is
further discussed in detail in upcoming section.
Fig. 4: Wireshark (T-Shark)- Example filters for Live Capturing;”figure reused from scientific paper” [19], [20]
D. Anomaly Detection Techniques: Network Intrusion Detec-
tion Systems
To the best of literature review, we are concluding that
intrusion prevention techniques are imperfect, monitoring for
security compromises is required. This is the basic role of
network intrusion detection systems (IDSs). Our proposed
NIDS aim to detect malicious activity in near *real-time and
raise an alert.
Anomaly detection in intrusion based detection systems
provides a way to detect a number of attacks, which results
network failures at real time or be the basis for future mishaps.
Curing anomaly detection at early stages are preferable
due to many factors including cost, response time of system,
customer satisfaction.
In this paper, we are utilizing following listed supervised
techniques for anomaly detection.
• k-nearest neighbors algorithm
• Naive bayes
• Random forest
• Decision Tree
• Support Vector Machine
In this section we are not supposed to discuss models details
in perspective of machine learning although interested readers
are redirected to these [24], [25].
E. Spark cluster simulation phase
According to our architecture, after preprocessing of dataset,
Spark comes in action to deliver requested work. In this paper
we are considering spark standalone cluster consists of five
worker node including one of them work as master node
as well. Apache Spark is a cluster computing platform as
stated in [26], [27] designed to be as fast as near real time
response rate, Spark extends the popular MapReduce model
to efficiently support more types of computations, including
interactive queries and stream processing. It’s speed is important
in processing large datasets, as it means the difference between
exploring data interactively and waiting minutes or hours. One
of the main features Spark offers for speed is the ability to
run computations in memory, but the system is also more
efficient than MapReduce for complex applications running on
disk. Apache Spark is also designed to cover a wide range of
workloads that previously required separate distributed systems,
including batch applications, iterative algorithms, interactive
queries, and streaming. By supporting these workloads in
the same engine, Spark makes it easy and cost effective to
combine different processing types, which is often necessary
in production data analysis pipelines. In addition, Apache
spark reduces the management burden of maintaining separate
tools. Spark also supports collection of different programming
languages including R,Python,Scala etc. Refer to the following
subsection for configuration guidelines for getting started with
Spark.
1) Spark Cluster Configuration: Spark cluster is a network
of computers. A cluster consist of a master and n* slaves. (N
is limited)
Master: Master is the leader of all servers that monitors how
slaves are working. It divides the task and take care of rest.
Slaves: These are the computers that receive job from master
node and perform job. They are responsible to process chunks
of your massive datasets following the Map Reduce paradigm.
A computer can be master and slave at the same time.
Spark offers/supports three types of cluster including stan-
dalone, Yarn and Mesos. Standalone: Spark is responsible to
manage it’s own cluster.
Yarn: Spark use Hadoop’s Yarn resource manager.
Mesos: Spark Apache’s dedicated resource manager.
F. Result and Notification
In this stage our proposed framework suggest to generate
notification to avoid future vulnerabilities and to mitigate from
current attacks. On successful completion of learning tasks,
final result file will be transferred and admin server will get
notified for anomalies (for this we are using command line
based interface to track all interaction). Figure-3 presents a
complete illustration of our proposed framework.
IV. SAD-F: SCIENTIFIC DATASETS
Network anomaly detection is the challenging task due to
dynamic nature of netflow traffic. The paper focuses on the
general analytics/techniques to detect anomalies in network.
The study exploring following datasets
• KDD Cup 99
• UNSW-NB15
All of the mentioned datasets are in .pcap format provided by
sources [28], [29]. Further following subsection describes the
detailed discussion of listed dataset individually.
A. Datasets for System Evaluation
This study does not require any specific traffic data because
In this paper we are proposing a general framework. But we
recommend these Netflow datasets KDD-CUP 99, and UNSW-
NB15. Even though KDD-CUP 99 is not use full anymore
because it is lacking most of the new types of attacks but
we took this dataset for testing and proof of concept of our
deployed framework.
• KDD Cup 99: Since 1999, KDD99 noticed to be the
widely used dataset for evaluation of anomaly detection
methods [30]–[32]. This dataset is prepared by [30] and
is built based on the data captured in DARPA98 IDS
evaluation program [30].
”This is the data set used for The Third International
Knowledge Discovery and Data Mining Tools Competi-
tion, which was held in conjunction with KDD-99 The
Fifth International Conference on Knowledge Discovery
and Data Mining. The competition task was to build a
network intrusion detector, a predictive model capable of
distinguishing between “bad” connections, called intru-
sions or attacks, and “good” normal connections. This
database contains a standard set of data to be audited,
which includes a wide variety of intrusions simulated in a
military network environment.” The dataset’s attacks fall
in to four categories:
– Denial of Service Attack (DoS): DoS is one the attack
type in which the intruder makes some computing
or memory resource too busy to handle legitimate
requests, or denies legitimate users access to a
machine.
– User to Root Attack (U2R): It is a class of exploit
in which the attacker starts out with access to a
normal user account on the system (perhaps gained
by sniffing passwords, a dictionary attack, or social
engineering) and is able to exploit some vulnerability
to gain root access to the system.
– Remote to Local Attack (R2L): It occurs when an
attacker who has the ability to send packets to a
machine over a network but who does not have an
account on that machine exploits some vulnerability
to gain local access as a user of that machine.
– Probing Attack: Probing is an attempt to gather infor-
mation about a network of computers for the apparent
purpose of circumventing its security controls.
• UNSW-NB15: For the evaluation of performance and
effectiveness of network intrusion detection system, we
require a comprehensive dataset which contains both
normal and abnormal behaviors. Lot of research has been
done using older benchmark data sets like KDDCUP 99
and NSLKDD but these data sets do not offer realistic
output performance. The reason is that KDD CUP 99 has
lots of redundant and missing records in the training set.
So these datasets are not comprehensive representation of
modern low foot print attack environment which concludes
that we need a dataset which fulfills the requirements.
The UNSW-NB 15 data set was created by utilizing an
”IXIA PerfectStorm tool” to extract a hybrid of modern
normal and contemporary attack activities of network
traffic. A tcpdump tool was used to capture ”100 GB” of
raw network traffic (pcap files). Each pcap file contains
”1000 MB” in order to make analysis of packets easier.
UNSW-NB15 dataset is available in comma-separated
values(CSV) file format.This data set contains 2,540,044
records which are stored in four CSV files. Moreover, a
part from this data set was divided into a training set and
a testing set. The training set involved 175,341 records,
while the testing set contained 82,332 records with all
different 9 types of attack and normal records. There are
45-49 attributes or features with 10 class values in this
dataset. All records are divided in two major categories
of the records - normal and attack. Furthermore the attack
category is again subdivided into 9 categories of attack
types. [33].
– Fuzzers: It is an attack in which the attacker attempts
to discover security loopholes in an application,
operating system or a network by feeding it with the
massive inputting of random data to make it crash.
– Worms: It is an attack in which the attacker replicates
itself to spread on other computers. Often, it utilizes
a computer network to spread itself, depending on
the security failures of the target computer used to
access it.
– Reconnaissance: This attack category also known as
probe, and it is an attack which gathers information
about a computer network to evade its security
controls.
– Analysis: It is a type of variety intrusions that
penetrate the web applications via ports (e.g. port
scans), emails (e.g. spam) and web scripts (e.g. HTML
files).
– Backdoors: It is a technique of bypassing a stealthy
normal authentication, securing unauthorized remote
access to a device, locating the entrance to plain text,
as it struggles to continue unobserved.
– DoS: It is an intrusion which disrupts the computer
resources via memory so as to cause excessive
business, in order to prevent authorized requests from
accessing a device.
– Exploits: It is a sequence of instructions that takes
advantage of a glitch, bug or vulnerability, causing
an unintentional or unsuspected behavior on a host
or a network.
– Generic: It is a technique that establishes against
every block-cipher using a hash function to cause a
collision without respect to the configuration of the
block-cipher.
– Shellcode:It is a malware in which the attacker
penetrates a slight piece of code starting from a shell
to control the compromised machine.
Furthermore, research studies [6], [33] divided this dataset
in to six different categories as follows:
– Flow features: This group includes the identifier
attributes between hosts, such as client-to-serve or
server-to-client.
– Basic features: this category involves the attributes
that represent protocols connections.
– Content features: this group encapsulates the attributes
of TCP/IP; also they contain some attributes of http
services.
– Time features: this category contains the attributes
of time, for example, arrival time between packets,
start/end packet time and round trip time of TCP
protocol.
– Additional generated features: it includes general
purpose features and connection features.
– Labelled Features: this group represents the label of
each record.
SNo Feature
Name
Feature Description
1 srcip Source IP address.
2 sport Source port number.
3 dstip Destinations IP address.
4 dsport Destination port number.
5 proto Protocol type, such as TCP, UDP.
TABLE I: Flow Features; Table reproduced from scientific
papers [29] and [6], [33]
From the selected datasets, we focus on a specific group of
attacks as discussed above in subsection IV. The considered
SNo Feature
Name
Feature Description
6 state The states and its dependent protocol e.g., CON.
7 dur total duration.
8 sbytes Source to destination bytes.
9 dbytes Destination to source bytes.
10 sttl Source to destination time to live.
11 dttl Destination to source time to live.
12 sloss Source packets retransmitted or dropped.
13 dloss Destination packets retransmitted or dropped.
14 service Such as http, ftp, smtp, ssh, dns and ftpdata.
15 sload Source bits per second.
16 dload Destination bits per second.
17 spkts Source to destination packet count.
18 dpkts Destination to source packet count.
TABLE II: Basic Features; Table reproduced from scientific
papers [29] and [6], [33]
SNo Feature
Name
Feature Description
19 swin Source TCP window advertisement value.
20 dwin Destination TCP window advertisement value.
21 Stcpb Source TCP base sequence number.
22 dtcpb Destination TCP base sequence number.
23 smeansz Mean of the packet size transmitted by the srcip.
24 dmeansz Mean of the packet size transmitted by the dstip.
25 transdepth The connection of http request or response transac-
tion.
26 resbdylen The content size of the data transferred from http
TABLE III: Content Features;Table reproduced from scientific
papers [29] and [6], [33]
SNo Feature
Name
Feature Description
27 sjit Source jitter.
28 djit Destination jitter.
29 stime start time.
30 ltime last time.
31 sintpkt Source inter-packet arrival time.
32 dintpkt Destination inter-packet arrival time.
33 tcprtt Setup round-trip time, the sum of synack and ackdat.
34 synack The time between the SYN and the SYN-ACK
packets.
35 ackdat The time between the SYN-ACK and the ACK
packets.
36 ismipports If srcip (1) = dstip (3) and sport (2) = dsport (4),
assign 1 else 0.
TABLE IV: Time Features; Table reproduced from scientific
papers [29] and [6], [33]
algorithms were trained to detect each of these attack types
independently and in parallel, in the same fashion as in [10],
[34]. As a result, each detection approach can detect the
occurrence of an attack and also classify its nature.
V. TESTBED DESIGN STEPS
This section highlights and discuss the implementation
design steps of proposed framework. The following subsection
are small components which need to configured before the
execution of system.
A. Testbed setup
We design and tested our framework on two different testbed
we named one as ”low end” testbed and ”high end” testbed.
SNo Feature
Name
Feature Description
37 ctstatettl No. of each state (6) according to values of sttl
(10) and dttl (11).
38 ctflwhttpmthd No. of methods such as Get and Post in http
service.
39 isftplogin If the ftp session is accessed by user and
password then 1 else 0.
40 ctftpcmd No of flows that has a command in ftp session.
41 ctsrvsrc No. of rows of the same service (14) and srcip
(1) in 100 rows.
42 ctsrvdst No. of rows of the same service (14) and dstip
(3) in 100 rows.
43 ctdstltm No. of rows of the same dstip (3) in 100 rows.
44 ctsrcltm No. of rows of the srcip (1) in 100 rows.
45 ctsrcdportltm No of rows of the same srcip (1) and the dsport
(4) in 100 rows.
46 ctdstsportltm No of rows of the same dstip (3) and the sport
(2) in 100 rows.
47 ctdstsrcltm No of rows of the same srcip (1) and the dstip
(3) in 100 records.
TABLE V: Additional generated Features;Table reproduced
from scientific papers [29] and [6], [33]
SNo Feature
Name
Feature Description
48 Attackcat The name of each attack category.
49 Label 0 for normal and 1 for attack records.
TABLE VI: Labelled Features;Table reproduced from scientific
papers [29] and [6], [33]
Both have different specification in terms of hardware.
For low end testbed we configured 3 worker nodes and 1
master node. Each node is physically independent of each other.
Each system contains 8GB of memory and 500 GB of Hard
Disk and 2.7 GHz of processor. Collectively this cluster setup
consist of 10*16 GB of memory, 10*500 GB of space and
3*3.5 GHz of processor as per configuration of previous study
[10].
For high end testbed we configured 2 worker nodes and
one master node. Each node is physically independent of each
other. Each system contains 16GB of memory and 1TB of
Hard Disk and 3.5 GHz of processor. Collectively this cluster
setup consist of 2*16 GB of memory, 2*1 TB of space and
3*3.5 GHz of processor.
B. Netflow traffic selector
As shown in figure-3, our proposed framework is flexible
with either live traffic or passive traffic selector. At the current
stage we only used passive traffic selector. At this step system
requires required traffic file after that system will transfer that
file to the log file for further processing. Following two option
are available as traffic selector.
• Live network traffic capturing server
• Passive traffic
C. Log server
After receiving file at this stage log server will kept that
file for future need if there is any discrepancy in results
admin/network administrator can do manual work to take
respective actions.
D. Preprocessing file
We designed a preprocessing function which is efficient
and it is designed with respect to the netflow dataset but it is
quite easy to change it’s parameters to fit with a new netflow
dataset, following are the few steps which we considered while
designing preprocessing module.
• Data file splitting by time stamp
• Calculating hash of features at run-time
• Converting features into OneHotEncoding at run-time
Before beginning for further classification of network traffic,
we split targeted data by time-slot to reduce the size of file. For
example, a one hour network trace file were split in multiple
10-Seconds files. General command to split network trace file
based on time-slot. ”editcap -i file-split-time filename.pcap
file-split-time.pcap”
For preprocessing, we designed our own methodology which
aims to read the data file and load it into data-frame. Then
data-frame were read individually by features set. By Deep
feature inspection we noticed data type of each feature after
that we used appropriate conversion method for each feature
refer to tables [I, II, III, IV, V and VI] for detailed dataset
feature set.
E. File transfer to spark cluster
After taking all the necessary steps, preprocessed file arrives
at spark phase on which system distributes the file to the worker
node which is one of the spark’s core job.
F. Model selection
We implemented five supervised learning algorithms KNN,
RF, DT, NB and SVM and one unsupervised algorithm kMeans
to train as referenced in [10].
G. Model testing
We used training model as our base model to classify whether
the incoming network traffic to the server or main node is
normal or an attack.
H. Admin panel
Whoever will deploy our framework to improve their network
operation in terms of DDoS detection they can design their
admin panel as per requirements. The framework is capable
of further integration. At this stage we used Ubuntu command
prompt system to tackle admin related tasks like start/stop the
operations.
VI. EXPERIMENTS AND RESULT ANALYSIS
The framework is independent of netflow dataset selection,
however we explored and practically implemented the UNSW-
NB-15 dataset is publicly available at [29] since 2015 and to
the best of our knowledge this is the most suitable and well
described dataset available for researchers to work. Apache
Spark Framework: Apache Spark based anomaly detection
framework and MLib libraries are used. Five well-known
machine learning algorithms are used, namely [KNearestNeigh-
bour, NaveBayes, DecisionTree, SuportVectorMachine and
Fig. 5: Capture and transfer time of a log file.
RandomForest] are used for performance evaluation. Recently,
similar work has been proposed by [27]. One may compare
the significant result difference of our proposed work with this
work.
A. Performance evaluation:
The overall performance of SAD-F depends upon time taken
to capture and transfer log file to the testbed in real time mode.
The system is totally depend upon time taken to read chunk of
traffic volume and time taken to classify each chunk and moves
forward for next chunk of traffic as in upcoming tables [1-3]
we presented two variation of chunk size i-e 300 and 1000
and it also depend upon the time taken by specific classifier to
detect chunk and generate false alarm + negligible overhead
of the system.
For performance evaluations we benchmark our results which
focuses on selection of classifier, file size, total volume of traffic,
false alarm rate, chunk size of traffic volume and detection
time.
Figure-5 depicts total time taken to capture and transfer real
traffic (using Wireshark T-Shark library) on our deployed main
node. Traffic capturing time is almost linear to the file size, as
the file size is increasing it is also increasing. It took almost
20 seconds to capture a file size of 10MB while it took 420
seconds to capture 1 GB file on the other hand it may also
noticed that as file size is increasing the volume of traffic is
also increasing so both relations are linear co-related. This
shows a clear improvement in throughput with the increase in
file size and volume of traffic.
One point must be noted at this stage that these calculations
are the proof of concept while we did not continued with
real time strategy although we are reading chunk of data
and simulating like a real time (near real time) but these
measurements will be use full for future researcher.
Figure-6 list dataset volume w.rt. to file size and packets
count.
1) Comparison of preprocessing, training and testing cost on
local machine vs SAD-Framework: Scientific reading presented
in this Table VII taken from local machine (8GB of RAM and
2.50 GHz of processor) while reading presented in Table VIII
and IX are taken from SAD-Framework.
Fig. 6: Relationship of Dataset Size and Traffic Volume
Model Train/Test file size and
Traffic volume
Overall
Time
Accuracy
kNN 150 MB 40 MB (999999,
300000)
12605 92
DT 150 MB 40 MB (999999,
300000)
6565 94.40
RF 150 MB 40 MB (999999,
300000)
6549 92.98
NB 150 MB 40 MB (999999,
300000)
6536 72.6
SVM 150 MB 40 MB (500000,
200000)
71317 87.62
TABLE VII: Relationship of train/test time (in seconds) and
Accuracy of model in percentage on a local machine
These reading were taken from low end testbed. Measure-
ments of KNN is not presented in above tables VIII and
IX because kNN is not supported by SPARK distributed
architecture [35].
By analysing readings from above presented tables VII,
VIII and IX which clearly shows the improvement. Here we
conclude our proof of work that our deployed frameworks.
Next section focuses on actual scientific reading taken from
SAD-F on both testbed individually by simulating near real
time traffic.
B. Near real time traffic classification by SAD-F:
Our system has the capability to simulate traffic in form of
single/multiple rows and in networks terminology chunk of
traffic volume after that our program will pass this traffic to
classifier/function to classify the traffic behavior and generate
false alarm if system detected as any malware available in
selected chunk of data and repeats the process to select another
chunk of volume till end of file.
This simulated traffic can also be a real time traffic refer
to figure-5, but it needs an extra amount of efforts in terms
of time for preprocessing to include all the required features
set for proper working and to increase accuracy and time
taken by logging and transferring such traffic volume to the
testbed/deployed framework.
We evaluated the performance of our framework on the basis
of different size of the log file which is depicted in figure-6.
Model Train/Test file size and
Traffic volume
Overall
Time
Accuracy
DT 150 MB 40 MB (999999,
300000)
90 94.40
RF 150 MB 40 MB (999999,
300000)
360 92.98
NB 150 MB 40 MB (999999,
300000)
204 72.6
SVM 150 MB 40 MB (500000,
200000)
14400 87.62
TABLE VIII: Relationship of train/test time (in seconds) and
Accuracy of model in percentage on a low end testbed
Model Train/Test file size and
Traffic volume
Overall
Time
Accuracy
DT 150 MB 40 MB (999999,
300000)
32 92.23
RF 150 MB 40 MB (999999,
300000)
200 91.68
NB 150 MB 40 MB (999999,
300000)
104 78.54
SVM 150 MB 40 MB (500000,
200000)
2890 86.52
TABLE IX: Relationship of train/test time (in seconds) and
Accuracy of model in percentage on a high end testbed
For testbed evaluation we individually noted spark file loading
and distributing time, file preprocessing time, detection time
of algorithm and total time taken by spark cluster to complete
the experiment. For the scientific reason we calculated average
of three measurements for individual experiments. Following
paragraphs shows low end testbed and high end testbed results
respectively.
C. Low end Testbed Result Charts
Packet Count DT RF NB SVM
100K 1.2008 0.9705 0.7536 153.2593
450K 1.5635 1.5776 5.9583 543.8486
1000K 3.3746 2.8163 21.0618 946.4972
1800K 179.453 66.4375 38.9206 1176.6666
2500K 428.3554 376.1895 442.9408 2008.8368
3400K 643.8411 613.1385 850.6137 2900.5085
TABLE X: Detection time taken by different classifier w.r.t
Packet Size
Table X shows the average detection time taken by different
detection models namely [DT: Decision Tree, RF: Random
Forest, NB: Naive Bayes and SVM: Support Vector Machine].
We noticed that NB performed better than all three remaining
models and took 0.6 and 2.5 seconds for 100K and 450K
packets count respectively and RF took 4.46 seconds for 1000K
packets count. We also noticed that on average RF performed
well w.r.t all three models and took maximum 335 seconds for
3400K packets count while SVM is taking maximum time w.r.t
all three models. SVM took almost 90 seconds for 10MB log
file which consist of 100K packets count and it took approx
860 seconds for 500 MB file which reflects 3400K packet
count. We also presented these results in pictorial form which
is depicted in figure-7.
Fig. 7: Detection time taken by different classifier w.r.t Packet
Size
Figure figure-7 shows complete picture of detection time
taken by different detection models. On horizontal axis we
placed total packet counts I.e [100K, 450K, 1000K, 1800K,
2500K and 3400K]. On vertical axis we placed time in seconds.
This figure-7 is exact representation of the above X.
File Size DT RF NB SVM
10MB 0.3833 0.204 0.4069 1.0088
50MB 4.1349 0.5576 1.7388 1.2349
100MB 5.4611 0.5618 2.6002 3.2608
200MB 8.8026 0.5812 4.5489 9.1338
400MB 53.7333 2.9055 32.6329 15.5418
500MB 98.2872 60.3406 121.6788 26.4873
TABLE XI: File loading and distributing time taken by spark
w.r.t file size
Fig. 8: File loading and distributing time taken by spark w.r.t
file size
Table XI shows the average file loading and distribution time
taken by spark cluster w.r.t to file size in mega bytes. Reading
shows that least time taken by spark 0.204 seconds for 10MB
file while the maximum time taken by spark for the file size
of 500MB is 98 seconds that is almost 1.5 minutes.
We also presented the above tubular form results in the
pictorial form below refer to the figure figure-8. It shows
complete picture of file time taken by different models and
log file size .On horizontal axis we placed log file size in
mega bytes I.e [10M, 50MB, 100M, 400MB and 500MB].
On vertical axis we placed time in seconds I.e vary from 1
seconds to 120 seconds. Table XII and figure-9 respectively
Packet Count DT RF NB SVM
100K 1.5676 1.2247 0.5849 89.9029
450K 3.4877 2.5367 2.5141 137.0856
1000K 7.7287 4.4672 4.4725 281.1723
1800K 25.3764 9.1906 8.7517 642.9673
2500K 180.3885 216.0378 94.5724 724.8311
3400K 295.8082 335.2831 338.404 861.5172
TABLE XII: Preprocessing time taken by model w.r.t file size
Fig. 9: Preprocessing time taken by model w.r.t file size
shows the average of three scientific reading of time taken
by each models with respect to the total packets count. We
noticed that preprocessing time increases as the file size or
packets counts increases in every case but at the same time
we noticed that it is not directly proportional to packets count
but it is only dependent upon the machine learning model how
fast it preprocess the small chunk of packet count and how
much time it will take for large chunk of data. Naive Bayes
remains the best preprocessing model for 100K packets and it
took only 0.6 seconds to preprocess while at the same time it
took approx 338 seconds for 3400K packets count. On average
RF were remain the best model among all it took only [1.23
seconds and 335 seconds] for 100K and 3400K packets counts
respectively. SVM remains the worst pre processor as well as
worst classifier refer to table X and figure-7.
Table XIII lists the complete time taken by spark user
interface which is actual sum of all individual times includ-
ing (file time, preprocessing time and detection/classification
time).figure-10 is the pictorial presentation of above mentioned
table. Refer to Figure[7, 8, 9, 10, 11 and 12] for low testbed
results conclusion. figure-7 and Table X shows detection time
taken by specific model/classifier to classify packets with
respect to the packet count. We noticed that for both [Decision
File Size DT RF NB SVM
10MB 6.3333 5.0001 4.1666 352.6666
50MB 11.0002 7.3333 11.3333 706.6666
100MB 19.0001 11.3333 36.0001 1270.3333
200MB 252.6666 105.6666 165.6666 2086.6666
400MB 707.3333 644.3333 614.3333 3466.6666
500MB 1079.3333 1075.6666 1550.6666 4460.3333
TABLE XIII: Time taken by spark w.r.t file size a.k.a SPARK
UI TIME
Fig. 10: Time taken by spark w.r.t file size a.k.a SPARK UI
TIME
Fig. 11: Throughput Analysis (Packets/second) w.r.t Packet
Count
Tree and Random Forest] models took less 5 seconds to classify
100K packets while [Random Forest] model took approx 21
seconds and SVM took maximum time than all three. We also
noticed that overall [Random Forest] perform better than all
other classifier in terms of detection packets counts per second.
D. High end Testbed Result Charts
Table XIV shows the average detection time taken by
different detection models namely [DT: Decision Tree, RF:
Random Forest, NB: Naive Bayes and SVM: Support Vector
Machine]. We noticed that DT performed better than all three
remaining models and took 0.17 and 0.5 seconds for 100K
and 450K packets count respectively while DT took only 80
Fig. 12: Detailed throughput analysis packets/second
Packet Count DT RF NB SVM
100K 0.1707 0.4046 2.518 305.1077
450K 0.5454 1.2576 7.1007 454.2456
1000K 1.8796 3.0908 11.2807 916.556
1800K 5.0688 5.5479 27.5153 1540.5229
2500K 6.6027 93.9212 180.1262 1718.1377
3400K 79.8791 156.749 478.5542 1844.2807
TABLE XIV: Detection time taken by different classifier w.r.t
Packet Size
Fig. 13: Detection time taken by different classifier w.r.t Packet
Size
seconds to process 3400K packets. Which is far better than
our previous spark cluster i.e. low end testbed. On other hand
RF took 0.4 seconds for 100K packets count. We also noticed
that on average RF performed well w.r.t NB and SVM while
SVM is taking maximum time w.r.t all three models. SVM
took almost 305 seconds for 10MB log file which consist of
100K packets count and it took approx 1844 seconds for 500
MB file which reflects 3400K packet count. We also presented
these results in pictorial form which is depicted in Figure- 13.
figure-13 shows complete picture of detection time taken
by different detection models. On horizontal axis we placed
total packet counts I.e [100K, 450K, 1000K, 1800K, 2500K
and 3400K]. On vertical axis we placed time in seconds. This
Fig. 14: File loading and distributing time taken by spark w.r.t
file size
figure-13 is exact representation of the above XIV.
File Size DT RF NB SVM
10MB 0.4007 0.2865 0.4239 0.5681
50MB 1.0771 0.2757 1.0425 0.7659
100MB 1.7559 0.2793 1.7353 1.7181
200MB 4.2826 0.2687 3.4016 3.1394
400MB 5.305 0.272 7.3116 9.2446
500MB 11.4324 0.2751 9.8913 11.9497
TABLE XV: File loading and distributing time taken by spark
w.r.t file size
Table XV presents the average file loading and distribution
time taken by spark cluster w.r.t to file size in mega bytes.
Reading shows that least time taken by spark 0.2865 seconds
for 10MB file while the maximum time taken by spark for the
file size of 500MB is approx 12 seconds which is also better
than our low end cluster.
We also presented the above tubular form results in the
pictorial form below refer to the figure-14. It shows complete
picture of file time taken by different models and log file
size .On horizontal axis we placed log file size in mega bytes
I.e [10M, 50MB, 100M, 400MB and 500MB]. On vertical
axis we placed time in seconds I.e vary from 1 seconds to
120 seconds. Table XVI and figure-15 respectively shows
Packet Count DT RF NB SVM
100K 0.5234 0.5074 1.1769 2.6776
450K 1.5384 1.433 3.1147 4.5669
1000K 3.4672 3.2363 5.259 6.524
1800K 8.9085 6.0414 11.2844 82.0879
2500K 18.3818 11.5615 94.2082 359.9464
3400K 20.7432 19.8323 122.1618 564.5891
TABLE XVI: Preprocessing time taken by model w.r.t file size
the average of three scientific reading of time taken by each
models with respect to the total packets count. We noticed
that preprocessing time increases as the file size or packets
counts increases in every case but at the same time we noticed
that it is not directly proportional to packets count but it is
Fig. 15: Preprocessing time taken by model w.r.t file size
only dependent upon the machine learning model how fast it
preprocess the small chunk of packet count and how much
time it will take for large chunk of data.
Random Forest remains the overall best preprocessing model
for 100K till 3400K packets and it took only 0.5 seconds to
preprocess 100K while at the same time it took approx 19.8
seconds for 3400K packets count. While DT, NB performed
well w.r.t low end testbed and SVM remains the worst pre
processor as well as worst classifier refer to table XIV and
figure-13.
File Size DT RF NB SVM
10MB 4.3333 5.3333 6.0001 311.6666
50MB 6.0001 7.0001 12.0001 522.3333
100MB 8.0001 9.3333 19.0001 965.6666
200MB 19.3333 16.6666 44.6666 1648
400MB 32.3333 126.3333 289.3333 2118.3333
500MB 191.0001 201.3333 647.3333 2493
TABLE XVII: Time taken by spark w.r.t file size a.k.a SPARK
UI TIME
Table XVII lists the complete time taken by spark user
interface which is actual sum of all individual times includ-
ing (file time, preprocessing time and detection/classification
time).figure-16 is the pictorial presentation of above mentioned
table.
Refer to figures[13, 14, 15, 16, 17 and 18] for low testbed
results conclusion. figure-13 and Table XIV shows detection
time taken by specific model/classifier to classify packets with
respect to the packet count. We noticed that for both [Decision
Tree and Random Forest] models took less five seconds to
classify 1800K packets while [Random Forest] model took
approx 27 seconds and SVM took maximum time than all
three. here reader can see the actual difference in time to detect
number of packets with ”low end” and ”high end” testbed. We
also noticed that overall [Random Forest] perform better than
all other classifier in terms of detection packets counts per
second. It took only 156 seconds to detect 3400K packets
which is 400 percent better than low end.
Fig. 16: Time taken by spark w.r.t file size a.k.a SPARK UI
TIME
Fig. 17: Throughput Analysis (Packets/second) w.r.t Packet
Count
E. Overall discussion
We computed and presented actual results in terms of
detection time and remaining referenced figures[14, 15 and
16], and tables[XV, XVI and XVII] are for reference to the
reader for self understanding that how much time (in seconds)
our framework took to load file, to preprocess and last but not
the least how much actual time taken by spark testbed on each
run.
Figures[11 and 17] are representing throughput of both
testbeds respectively. While figures[12 and 18] are showing
additional information of throughput and referenced both charts
are additional efforts to understand results in better manner.
In addition to the system execution, figure 19, figure 20,
figure 21 and figure 22 present a step by step result of the test-
bed, which includes ”view of Spark executor after submitting
job to testbed”, ”preprocessing of data”,”snapshot of spark
user interface after submission of job to testbed” and ”view of
simulated traffic”.
After submission of spark job one can see it’s status including
worker node information, spark cluster specification, running
jobs and completed job by visiting spark web user interface
Fig. 18: Detailed throughput analysis packets/second
using REST URL or SPARK URL.
Spark executor’s are the proof that the job is being executing
in right manner and it is reflected in figure 19. Figure-20 reflects
the snapshot of preprocessing work which is quite interesting
for detailed working information of the preprocessor module
with respect to the model/classifier.
In Figure-22 vulnerable traffic is highlighted with red color
to distinguish from normal traffic. At this stage, the proposed
framework is not generating any automated notifications for
manual action, but this can be extended and incorporated in
the framework for further actions.
VII. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we present SAD-F, a scalable Spark-based
live DDoS detection framework that is capable of analyzing
potential DDoS attacks with no time delays, as the performance
of the framework is tested against live and passive traffic. SAD-
F captures live network traffic, preprocesses it to extract relevant
information in brief form, and uses ML-Spark algorithms to
run detection algorithm for DDoS flooding attacks. SAD-
F solves the scalability, memory inefficiency, and process
complexity issues of conventional solution by utilizing parallel
data processing with low latency and high efficiency.
Before the framework deployment, we tested the dataset on
a local machine (8GB of RAM and 2.50 GHz of processor), the
evaluation results showed that SAD-F would take maximum
time of 12605 sec, i.e. 210 minutes to train and test the
overall file for the worst case with 92% of accuracy with
KNN model and it took 6536 sec, i.e 108 minutes for the best
case with 72% of accuracy with NB classifier for the maximum
file size of 150MB which comprised of an estimated 1300K
packets count. However our suggested SAD-F framework
with [low-end] testbed configuration took [5.0001 seconds and
1075.6666 seconds] to process (file loading, preprocessing to
classification) for 100K and 3400K packets count respectively
with RF classifier as the best case. While, the proposed
framework showed best results, according to proof of study,
SAD-F framework with [high-end] testbed configuration took
[4.3333 seconds and 191.0001 seconds] to process (file loading,
preprocessing to detecting) for 100K and 3400K packets
count respectively, with DT classifier as the best case. Based
on the framework benchmarks, we conclude active mode of
our proposed framework is significantly efficient in terms of
preprocessing and DDoS detection than passive mode, which
is traffic selector method.
Further, we noticed that data capturing phase consumes more
memory than preprocessing phase. Moreover, the appropriate
increase in cluster size can increase the lack of CPU utilization,
which will improve each stage of this framework. The proposed
framework can be used in parallel with conventional security
mechanisms to further optimise the results and detection time.
Fig. 19: View of Spark Executor after submitting job to testbed
Fig. 20: SAD-F: View of Preprocessing of Data
Fig. 21: Spark-UI: After submitting a job to testbed
Fig. 22: Snapshot view of simulated traffic: SAD-F Result
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